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ABSTRACT
In late colonial Basutoland and early independence Lesotho,
the issue of who could access citizenship rights and
passports became increasingly important. Political refugees
fleeing apartheid South Africa took up passports on offer in
the territory to further their political work. Basotho residents
also took up passports in increasing numbers as a way of
safeguarding their economic, social and political rights on
both sides of the border. The lure of a Citizens of the
United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) passport drew
refugees to Basutoland in the early 1960s, but it was South
Africa’s decision to leave the Commonwealth in 1961 that
spurred many in Lesotho to formalise their imperial
citizenship as well, even as independence for Lesotho
became increasingly likely. The stories of those taking up
papers illuminate how citizenship became a space for
contestation between individuals and governments. The
stories also show how the concept of the transfer of power
does not accurately reflect the ways in which the
sovereignty of newly independent African states, apartheid
South Africa and the United Kingdom were all limited by a
series of decisions made in the late colonial period. Tracing
these stories helps us better understand the limitations of
the term ‘decolonisation’ for reflecting the understandings






In June 2007, as political fall-out from a split in the ruling Lesotho Congress of
Democracy, journalist the Rev. Adam Lekhoaba revealed that Prime Minister
Pakalitha Mosisili possessed valid South African identity documents, despite
the fact that Lesotho constitutionally prohibited dual citizenship.1 Mosisili’s
papers came from his time working at South African universities in the 1980s
and early 1990s. The Lesotho government acknowledged the existence of
these documents, but denied that they had conferred citizenship on Mosisili,
saying they were necessary to formalise his residency status at the time for
employment purposes. The political storm about the identity documents
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rapidly blew over because many Basotho were in similar situations where they
either possessed or desired to possess formal South African papers that would
allow them to more easily visit family, find work or get better medical care
across the border. The contestation over both residency rights and citizenship
in Lesotho and South Africa that the issue raised was not new. The story pre-
sented here shows both the continuities and the ruptures in border and passport
policy at the transfer of power, as citizenship disputes in late colonial and newly
independent Lesotho reflected the limits of state sovereignty for both the new
state and the former colonial power, Great Britain.
These contestations in Lesotho were especially salient from the late 1950s to
the 1970s—a period of great political change that included South Africa’s 1961
commonwealth exit, Lesotho’s 1966 independence and multiple periods of
regional upheaval as various apartheid crackdowns created large numbers of
political refugees.2 Joe Matthews, a leader in both the African National Congress
(ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), fled to Lesotho in 1960
to avoid arrest in the wake of the Sharpeville massacre. Despite the misgivings of
the colonial government because of his known political affiliations, Matthews
gained an indefinite residence permit that allowed him to live legally in
Lesotho. For Matthews proximity to South Africa combined with the ability
to acquire residency rights, British citizenship and a Citizen of the UK and Colo-
nies (CUKC) passport after one year’s residence were the primary draws of the
territory. Utilising the freedom of movement that this document conferred, Mat-
thews made multiple trips behind the Iron Curtain to raise funds for South
African liberation organisations as well as local political parties. His case is
representative of how politically connected South Africans made use of late colo-
nial residency and citizenship laws to further anti-apartheid work.
Matthews was unusual among refugees in that he successfully obtained both a
residency permit and a British passport. Many refugees struggled to obtain per-
manent legal residency because that status typically required a successful claim
to ‘belonging’ in Lesotho. The resistance to granting refugees this status came
from colonial officials, but also from Basotho chiefs and politicians. In examin-
ing some of these refugee and asylum stories, this article heeds Rosenthal’s call to
utilise the experiences of refugees during decolonisation to better understand
how people were conceiving of national communities and nation-building pro-
cesses as they attempted to construct boundaries.3 This article also makes use of
the stories of prominent political refugees because of archival limitations that
make re-creating the experience of ordinary Basotho attempting to navigate
similar boundaries difficult. The national archives in Maseru do not contain
accessible records from the late colonial period and there is only one partial
district record preserved at the archives of the National University of Lesotho.
But recover these voices and stories we must to fully understand how
people understood citizenship and sovereignty. This article therefore uses the
available fragments also to elucidate how Basotho without extensive political
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contacts attempted to negotiate and utilise passports and border policy for their
own ends.
Passports and Citizenship
The border between South Africa and Lesotho, the ‘only country in the world
entirely surrounded by another independent state’, is an important place at
which to study questions of citizenship, sovereignty and passports.4 The
border is unusually salient in Lesotho because of its porous nature and its ubi-
quity for citizens in an enclave country. Shallow rivers, unfenced mountains and
broad expanses of farmland allowed for easy crossing of the frontier for those
who could not or did not want to utilise the formal processes. An ethnic
Basotho majority in most communities in the eastern Orange Free State and
Lesotho, combined with a shared imperial and commonwealth history made
legally crossing the border more an administrative formality than an obstacle
through much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.5 Most Basotho
had family on both sides of the border and the majority of Basotho who had
formal employment did so in South Africa, whether seasonally or as longer-
term migrants. The long history of Britain treating Lesotho as a labour reserve
with inadequate infrastructure and social services also meant that Basotho reg-
ularly crossed to access services from shopping to medical care.
In the 1960s, however, there was a new and different emphasis on documents
and controls that raised the stakes on who could legally cross and who could
claim ‘belonger’ status in Lesotho. South Africa, Lesotho and the United
Kingdom all failed to fully monopolise the ‘legitimate means of movement’
and hence claim sovereignty because people were able to manoeuvre around
passport restrictions.6 While South Africa was actively working to limit the
ability of black South Africans to access passports in the 1960s, it was the chan-
ging constitutional statuses of South Africa and Lesotho that precipitated a rush
by politically active citizens and ordinary Basotho to obtain passports, especially
in the wake of South Africa’s 1961 exit from the Commonwealth and Lesotho’s
1966 independence.7
Passports are effective for examining the limits of state sovereignty because
the number of people, both citizens and refugees, attempting to access pass-
ports spiked dramatically during this time. With many people obtaining pass-
ports despite the objections of particular states, studying passports shows that
in the decolonisation era states were often unable to ‘effectively distinguish
between citizens/subjects and possibly interlopers, and regulat[e] the move-
ments of each’.8 One reason the number of passport applicants spiked in
the 1960s was the apartheid state’s crackdown on political activity. The lure
of citizenship in Lesotho—a British citizenship in the colonial period and a
national citizenship after independence—drew individuals to the territory,
and highlighted for locals the benefits of possessing formal documents to
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prove and validate belonging. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, a majority of
Basotho possessed a passport.
Examining questions of local belonging and citizenship in the late empire
takes the study of British citizenship in the 1960s in a new direction. Many scho-
lars have focused on how the right of access to Britain for colonial subjects
altered domestic debates about citizenship, belonging and what it meant to be
British.9 In Lesotho the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act had little to no
impact, despite it being a key turning point in debates about colonial access to
the UK back in London. Rather, South Africa’s decisions to crack down on pol-
itical opposition in 1960 and to leave the Commonwealth in 1961, implementing
border controls with the three High Commission Territories for the first time,
were the catalysts for a sharp increase in citizenship and passport applications.
The trend of increased passport acquisition did not abate after Lesotho’s 1966
independence, but the late colonial policies constrained in important ways the
sovereignty of both the Lesotho and UK governments. Those who had gained
British citizenship and residency in Lesotho were supposed to transform seam-
lessly into becoming Lesotho citizens, but concerns about the political activities
of some of these individuals—couched in the language of national belonging—
meant that some refugees found their citizenship status in legal limbo. State con-
cerns about these people came from the fact that, as Salter notes, control over the
movement of ‘foreign nationals… reifies the international presence of the
nation-state, constructs the border in its crossing… and consequently creates
the sovereign character of the state’.10 So, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the possession of a passport continued to serve as a marker that a person
could demand rights from the government. Conversely, the lack of official
papers greatly handicapped individuals who could not claim ‘belonger’ status
in new states. With access to passports controlled by a confusing and interlock-
ing series of laws from multiple jurisdictions, attempting to untangle this
Gordian knot challenged the idea that decolonisation could be a simple
process for the colonisers or the colonised. The formal transfer of power in
1966, while important, was but one of many constitutional changes around inde-
pendence that affected the ability of individuals and governments to define and
claim sovereignty, citizenship and belonging.
Moving beyond the National in Late Imperial and Post-colonial
History
The meanings of the border between Lesotho and South Africa are still live issues
for many in Lesotho. Coplan notes that the porous nature of the border and the
economic inequalities found on opposite sides led to ‘a wide variety of strategic
forms of dual residency and nationality’ that are dealt with pragmatically by both
governments, which generally ‘turn a blind eye to dual nationality if the second
identity is acquired legally’.11 He has also traced how individuals understand and
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interact with the state controls inherent in the border, working to re-appropriate
spaces that are part of greater national imaginings, even if they happen to lie on
the other side of the physical border.12 Coplan’s work tends to frame discussion
within the narrow boundaries of national sovereignty, while this article builds
from Goulbourne’s note that British citizenship in the first half of the twentieth
century ‘was conferred on the individual “directly without reference to local citi-
zenship”’.13 It is this facet of citizenship that makes it so intriguing to study. In
the independence era, the lack of congruence between residency and citizenship
rights greatly complicated efforts by governments to exercise sovereignty.
By narrating attempts at citizenship acquisition, this article heeds Bailkin’s
call to recast the ‘archive of decolonization’ to better understand the ‘dismantling
and reconfiguration of imperial power’ by exposing the ability of individuals to
utilise the policies of the empire for personal or political gain.14 Passports and
citizenship also help us rethink decolonisation as a process that mattered to
people beyond the small class of those holding governmental power.15 It also
takes up Allman’s challenge to write post-colonial history by narrating the com-
plexity of the post-independence world through stories that rest not only on
national archives. This text takes up her call to write stories that are ‘both
deeply and specifically national and yet profoundly global’ by drawing on a mul-
tiplicity of sources from Lesotho, South Africa, the UK and the USA.16 The indi-
viduals who appear here were rooted in Lesotho and South Africa, but they also
deployed international attention via NGOs, utilised international law and made
multi-national appeals in their attempts to formalise rights and statuses. The
article also helps us to rethink the meanings of the Commonwealth after the
independence of colonies like Lesotho.17 Finally, this work extends to the colo-
nies’ analyses done by Matera and Perry on how peoples of African descent in
London played key roles in changing the meaning of British citizenship and
were part of meaningful transnational dialogues on race, human rights and
democracy.18 The ubiquity of the cases and the ease with which so many indi-
viduals accessed transnational political networks suggest that similar issues
around citizenship and passports were probably present in many other colonies
and the post-independence Commonwealth. Plenty of individuals in Lesotho
and South Africa understood that ‘power in the empire was fragmented’ and
they could utilise this knowledge to further their own political and economic
ends.19
Citizenship and Entry Laws
In order to understand the legal world that passport applicants were entering, it
is necessary to trace changes in citizenship law for the UK, South Africa and
Basutoland/Lesotho through the early and middle decades of the twentieth
century. The 1948 British Nationality Act expanded imperial citizenship in
response to dominion efforts that superseded imperial structures and threatened
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to undermine the idea of the Commonwealth.20 The law made every resident of
the colonies automatically a subject, and allowed these new subjects to gain citi-
zenship, and thus passports, through registration. It also reaffirmed the right of
free movement and entry into the United Kingdom for those who had the status
of British subject. This aspect of the law became increasingly contentious as the
membership of the ‘new’ Commonwealth increased and migration, especially
from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent, increased in the 1950s and
1960s.21 As Basutoland was a crown colony, the 1948 law gave residents the
right to take up citizenship, clearing the way for claims to passports by arrivals
in the 1960s.
South Africa also changed its citizenship laws in 1948–49 when the National
Party came to power on a platform of apartheid, Afrikaner nationalism and
scepticism towards Britain and the Commonwealth. The Union of South
Africa had first created a distinct category of South African nationality, that
of ‘Union National’, in 1927 with the passage of the Nationality and Flags
Act. This set up a situation of ‘double nationality’ whereby South Africans
were both ‘Union nationals’ and ‘British subjects’.22 The South African Citizen-
ship Act of 1949 abolished the status of Union national and replaced it with a
South African citizenship. The act also removed references to a common
status for citizens of the Commonwealth, a provision aimed at discouraging resi-
dents of the ‘new’ commonwealth countries like India, Pakistan and Ceylon
from attempting to take up South African citizenship. Additionally, the rule
undergirded South African efforts to disenfranchise Africans within their
borders in the coming years, efforts that would culminate in the 1970 law strip-
ping the South African citizenship of Africans deemed to be citizens of the newly
created ‘Bantu Homelands’.23 However, since South Africa was still a member of
the Commonwealth, South Africans could still register as British subjects and
receive a CUKC passport.24 For residents of Lesotho the 1949 law did not
change their ability to freely enter South Africa because of the continued com-
monwealth ties. There remained no border controls between South Africa and
the High Commission Territories (including Lesotho) until 1963, and people
who obtained a signed pass from their local officials continued to move freely
across the frontier. Local permissions gradually tightened through the 1950s
with the imposition in South Africa of a formal pass system and crackdowns
on Africans in urban areas. Still, as late as the mid-1950s, colonial officials
and chiefs in Lesotho could still write a simple pass allowing Basotho to take
up work and/or residence across wide swaths of rural South Africa.25
South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth on 31 May 1961 ended the
open border policy. Overnight, Basotho in South Africa lost their ‘belonger’
status, and were considered aliens under the 1949 law. The South African gov-
ernment delayed the imposition of formal border controls several times between
1961 and 1 July 1963, largely because of how frequently Basotho crossed the
border and how few Basotho had passports. The long history of easy movement
6 J. AERNI-FLESSNER
between the two countries, particularly around labour migration, compelled
many Basotho to apply for and receive passports after controls were announced.
For politically active South Africans, the end of commonwealth ties made the
three High Commission Territories more alluring because individuals could
still obtain British citizenship there after a year’s residency.26 South Africa’s
decision to leave the Commonwealth combined with the ongoing crackdown
on the ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) turned what had been a
trickle of political refugees in the 1950s into a flood that would continue una-
bated through the 1980s.
The High Commission Territories were, however, not particularly well
equipped to handle this influx of refugees because of their poverty and skeletal
colonial administrations. The primary aim of Basotho leaders prior to the 1960s
was protecting Lesotho’s territorial independence from South Africa. When the
1909 Act of Union brought modern South Africa into being, it promised the
eventual incorporation of Lesotho and the other High Commission Territories.
The British would have preferred to hand the territories over to South Africa in
1909, but lobbying from Basotho chiefs, who sent a delegation to London, kept
the territories from being subsumed under South Africa’s direct political control.
Still, the threat of incorporation hung over all political negotiations for the rest of
the colonial period. Basotho chiefs and 1950s–60s political leaders feared that
Britain would try to sell land in the territory to European settlers—something
that had happened in virtually every other crown colony across the empire.
The tenacious, single-minded focus from Basotho leaders kept Lesotho out of
South African hands, despite repeated overtures. However, this focus also
meant that when a new entrance and residency law came up for discussion in
1958, the national council failed to comprehend how the law would complicate
efforts to define residency and citizenship.
Questions of Basotho accessing British citizenship came up from time to time
in debates in 1950s Lesotho, but they were certainly not a major focus. In 1951,
with members of the national council pressing the resident commissioner to
define Lesotho’s constitutional status and state definitively that incorporation
was not part of British plans, he instead noted that there is ‘no difference
between a Crown Colony and a Protectorate except that people of a Crown
Colony are British subjects whereas the others are only protected subjects’.27
Tangential to their more pressing worries about incorporation, the status of
Basotho as British subjects eligible for citizenship elicited no comment from
the representatives.
The main focus of discussions among Basotho chiefs and colonial administra-
tors around the 1958 Entry and Residence Proclamation (ERP) was on how the
law might impact the threat of incorporation. The act’s ostensible purpose was to
codify who qualified for residency rights and how migrants could legally enter
the territory. There was almost no discussion about what might happen if a sig-
nificant voluntary migration of individuals to Lesotho should occur. This was
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hardly surprising as Lesotho in the late 1950s was not attractive to migrants,
being terribly poor with little existent infrastructure. It had attracted only a
handful of political refugees prior to 1960. This population consisted generally
of those fleeing immediate prosecution in South Africa or people who had famil-
ial contacts already in the territory. The ERP was a response to South Africa’s
1956 Riotous Assemblies Act, which gave Union authorities the right to
deport people from urban and ‘proclaimed’ areas. The worry in Lesotho was
that South Africa would ‘dump’ unwanted, ethnically Basotho South Africans
in the territory, since there was no statute on the books defining who had a
legal claim to residency. Basotho chiefs feared that South African authorities
would ‘pour thousands of people in here that we don’t want’.28 The discussion
in the national council thus centred on how to define those who had a right to
residency in the territory—what a birthright to the territory should entail and
who was Basotho ‘enough’ to join the national community.
The fundamental disagreement was over what constituted a birthright. There
was general agreement between Basotho representatives and colonial officials on
the need to limit the number of people who could claim residency. Councillor
Maqoaelane Hlekane argued that South African Basotho were part of a wider
ethnic group, but were not members of the national community and thus had
no claim to residency rights. They should ‘remain our relatives; we shall keep
on visiting them, and they will visit us, but [the council] should decide what
sort of people we accept to fill up this country’.29 Fellow councillor ‘Mako
Molapo took an even harsher view, calling Basotho not from Lesotho ‘tsotsis
[gangsters]’, arguing that they should ‘remain our cousins, but remain[e] in
the country where they were born and where they got spoiled’.30 This hard
stance against Sesotho-speaking, ethnic Basotho who happened to live in
South Africa denied the long history of border crossing. Comprehensive
figures are not available, and would not be particularly trustworthy because of
the informal/illegal nature of so many crossings, but border crossing in both
directions was a consistent theme in Lesotho’s history. The late colonial
period certainly saw no slowdown in the flow of migrants. New economic
opportunities available in South Africa combined with the continued impover-
ishment and lack of arable land in Lesotho perhaps, made migration even more
attractive.
Due to chiefly suspicions of the motives of British colonial officials, the 1958
ERP ended up cumbersome and hard to implement. Colonial officials were
reluctant to push too hard for control over residency decisions because they
feared losing the support of chiefs at a time when political developments in
the territory were increasingly turbulent.31 One result of this was that most of
the control over residency decisions remained in Basotho hands. This was in
keeping with the administrative structure in colonial Basutoland that gave
chiefs wide latitude to decide whether or not to accept arrivals. The new law
automatically granted residency to those who could claim a birthright, defined
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as being born in the territory or to Basotho parents outside the territory who
were properly registered. It created a series of control boards to decide the
cases of those applying for residency who did not have a birthright. The first
set of control boards at the district level could issue temporary residence
permits ranging in duration from months to years, as well as permanent resi-
dence permits to those whose applications were accepted by a local chief.
These boards had four members: the district or ward chief, the district commis-
sioner and two Basotho members nominated by the district council.
The law left Basotho largely responsible for controlling access to residency in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, and hence meant that local colonial subjects had
control over a process through which people could obtain British citizenship,
and passports, in the late empire. Like the district board, the central control
board in Maseru—comprised of a chief, a colonial official and two nominated
Basotho—could grant indefinite residence to those who wanted residency but
who were not applying for membership in the national community. Common
applicants to this board included missionaries, non-African traders and Africans
not applying through chiefs, including refugees.32 Slight amendments to the act
in 1960 reiterated that citizenship and residency rights were not coterminous—
even an indefinite residence permit issued by the central control board did not
give a person citizenship or ‘belonger’ status in Lesotho. The only reserved
power in the law was for the British high commissioner who retained the
right to declare persons prohibited immigrants, causing them to lose any resi-
dency rights. Overall, however, the ERP was the latest in a series of laws
dating back to the nineteenth century that left Basutoland governed not by indir-
ect rule, as with most of British colonial Africa, but by parallel rule.33 With three
Basotho on the four-person boards that determined residency, and hence citi-
zenship rights, colonial subjects were effectively acting as gatekeepers to imperial
citizenship in the late empire.
In practice, however, the ERP was less a neat system of well-run boards with a
logical progression and more often a confusing process, opaque and fairly easy to
avoid if individuals were so inclined. The law required arrivals only to start the
process within a month of setting foot in the territory if they planned to stay for
more than three months, which left wide latitude for individuals to live in the
territory without formal papers. Further, even if a decision on residency went
against an applicant, the government had a hard time repatriating people, as
public opinion in the UK and in Lesotho largely militated against handing
people over to the apartheid regime. Within Lesotho, the chieftaincy, tasked
with enforcement and implementation, did not eagerly embrace the new law.
Accepting new ‘belongers’ had long been a strategy for Basotho chiefs to gain
more influence relative to their peers in Lesotho by having more people eligible
for taxation under their administration.34 Complaints in 1959 from resident
commissioner Chaplin and paramount chief ‘Mantsebo that other chiefs were
not making migrants go through control boards suggest that many chiefs
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preferred to retain an individual prerogative over immigration and residency
matters, rather than use the new law.35
The lack of enforcement by the chiefs of the provisions of the ERP was also
reflective of continued tension between the chieftaincy and the colonial govern-
ment over control of urban spaces in Lesotho. The nine small urban administra-
tive centres were the only places in Lesotho under the direct control of the
colonial government, and chiefs viewed them as lawless spaces. This was
especially true for Maseru, which was seen as a haven for refugees. These criti-
cisms were on point as Resident Commissioner Chaplin noted in 1959 that he
was reluctant to order police sweeps in Maseru because they would net a
number of politically sensitive refugees. These individuals would be in contra-
vention of the ERP, but the colonial regime would be unable to deport them
because of the strong connections these individuals had with anti-colonial and
anti-apartheid organisations in the UK.36 In the wake of Sharpeville, the
number of politically sensitive individuals in Lesotho only increased. The inde-
pendent government of Lesotho inherited this problem from the colonial
administration in 1966, and the fate of political refugees remained a tricky pol-
itical issue in Lesotho until the end of apartheid.
For all the problems the colonial government faced with enforcing the ERP on
the (few) high-profile refugees in the territory in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it
was much more easily enforced on individuals entering the territory who lacked
international visibility and political connections. The only existent, though
partial, district archives for Lesotho come from the northern district of Leribe,
which was the jumping-off point for migrant labour from the central mountains
and the northern part of the territory through the Ficksburg Bridge border post.
A fragmentary record of Leribe local court cases from January to June of 1962
shows more than 20 cases brought under the ERP against individuals who did
not have legal residency. All of the defendants were found guilty, and every
one of those convicted chose to do time in jail rather than pay a fine of a few
pounds.37
The decision to serve time rather than pay the fine, along with the slowness
with which some of the refugee cases proceeded (detailed later in this article),
suggests the ERP ensnared mainly poor migrants. These people probably saw
themselves as ‘belongers’ in Lesotho who could not prove their status with docu-
mentation. In order to be considered a ‘belonger’ a person needed to have been
born in Lesotho or their parents must have registered their South African birth
with the high commissioner’s office. With many Basotho living illegally in South
Africa, there was hesitancy from many Basotho to come before any authorities
and register births, which meant that many who considered Lesotho their home
and wished to return lacked the proper documentation. For those with no famil-
ial ties, Lesotho held little or no draw because of the almost complete dearth of
formal employment prospects, and even a lack of an informal economy in much
of the territory. The surnames of those convicted were, further, mostly names
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common in Lesotho like Moshoeshoe, Lebakeng, Matjola, Morake and Mokoena.
These all point to the conclusion that most of those convicted of being in Lesotho
‘illegally’ probably felt that they ‘belonged’ to Lesotho. Without the international
connections that high-profile political refugees had, and without papers to prove
their status, these poor Basotho failed to gain access to the territory and the ERP
served to evict them. The prevalence of these cases also suggests that long before
independence many people understood the importance of passports and official
papers to defend and protect residency rights.
1960 and after: Sharpeville, Refugees and Passports
The massacre of pass protestors at Sharpeville in March 1960 and the subsequent
banning of the ANC and PAC greatly increased the number of people seeking to
leave South Africa. The three High Commission Territories—Basutoland,
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland—were the only places bordering
South Africa where refugees could seek asylum. Portugal still ruled Mozambi-
que, South Africa ruled Namibia and European settlers maintained power in
Southern Rhodesia. Lesotho might seem the least promising destination as it
lacked international transportation connections or a border with any other
state. Despite these limitations, Lesotho had the most developed political
system of any of the High Commission Territories, was close to major South
African population centres, offered arrivals the chance to access a CUKC pass-
port after a year of residence and had more flexible rules for arrivals than the
other territories. Under the ERP, a person who intended to stay for longer
than three months had to report within a month to a control officer—police
officer, chief or colonial official—to start the process of applying for a residency
permit, but this meant no one had to report to the authorities immediately.
Evading the ERP worked well for those looking to stay only a short time until
they could move on or return to South Africa. However, the cases of Joe Mat-
thews and Dr Arthur Elias showed how refugees could also make use of the
law and the British citizenship they could obtain through it to further their
own political work.
Vincent Joseph Gaobakwe Matthews was the son of ANC leader and aca-
demic Z. K. Matthews. He grew up in Alice, South Africa, the site of Fort
Hare University College, where his father taught. Politicised from a young age
—Oliver Tambo was one of his schoolteachers—he joined the ANC Youth
League in 1944 and rapidly moved up, taking a seat on the ANC National Execu-
tive by the mid-1950s. He was also recruited into the already banned South
African Communist Party (SACP) in 1958 and served on its Central Commit-
tee—the only individual in the late 1950s to sit on the central boards of both.
At the time of Sharpeville, he was practising as an attorney in Durban. Matthews
was arrested at 2 am on 30 March 1960 as the state of emergency went into
effect, but released on a technicality later that morning, as the judge had not
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yet received a copy of the legal declaration from Cape Town by the time of his 9
am court appearance.38 Upon release, he drove straight to Lesotho. Matthews’
connections in the territory included a close relationship with Basutoland Con-
gress Party (BCP) leader Ntsu Mokhehle, as they had been classmates and
members of the ANC Youth League together at Fort Hare. For Matthews, the
biggest draw of Lesotho was the prospect of using Maseru as a base from
which to continue the liberation struggle.
Matthews, unlike many poor or less well-connected migrants, could live
openly in Maseru, much to the chagrin of the British colonial authorities.
With so many arrivals living underground or at least attempting to surrepti-
tiously avoid colonial officials, the colonial regime did not have a good handle
on the number of people from South Africa present in the territory. British auth-
orities in May 1960 thought there were around 50 refugees total in the High
Commission Territory, but this number represented ‘no more than our best
guess’.39 At times the colonial authorities did not even know about the presence
of some of the most important liberation struggle leaders. A June 1960 flight to
Swaziland that Matthews arranged to get ANC leaders out of the territory, for
instance, revealed the presence of three of the leaders to British intelligence
for the first time.40 Zakes Mda, who had taken refuge in Lesotho with his
father, PAC activist A. P. Mda, also noted that the ‘Christian Council of
Lesotho had a much [more] up-to-date list of refugees than the government’.41
Rather than attempting to claim political asylum, Matthews applied for an
indefinite residence permit through the ERP, which was available to a wider
range of outsiders. An indefinite permit required the applicant to have employ-
ment in the territory, and it conferred the advantage of allowing the applicant to
live in urban Maseru rather than having to find a sympathetic chief. Matthews
thus claimed residency on the basis of his professional skills as an attorney—a
skill that was in short supply in late colonial Basutoland. He knew that a
claim to national ‘belonger’ status would have been denied, and applying as a
political refugee meant that the government would have had more latitude to
terminate his status once the state of emergency in South Africa ended. The
central control board approved his application in September 1961 ‘so long as
practicing as an attorney in Basutoland’.42 The permit came through despite
strong objections from the colonial government, which was well aware of Mat-
thews’ communist associations. The only colonial representative on the control
board, Government Secretary Gordon Hector, argued strenuously against Mat-
thews’ application, ‘draw[ing] the Board’s attention to popular misgivings about
Matthews’ political activities and their potential impact on relations between the
territory and South Africa’.43 Matthews’ strong personal connections with poli-
ticians and Lesotho’s constitutional monarch, Moshoeshoe II, allowed him to
gain residency despite his known communist activities and the opposition of
the colonial government. This legal residency allowed him to apply for and
receive a CUKC passport in 1962.
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The availability of a UK passport was a key feature attracting him to the ter-
ritory, and he had long planned to go to Lesotho if forced to flee South Africa. A
UK passport, as he said in an interview, would give him the freedom to ‘become
the traveller [for the ANC and SACP] who could go out, come back, go where
the leadership was in exile… as a British citizen, with a passport and every-
thing’.44 While he utilised the passport on some trips outside the territory, for
others he clandestinely slipped across the border to travel through Botswana.
Matthews made at least four trips to Moscow and other communist countries
between 1960 and 17 February 1965, when the high commissioner finally
declared him a prohibited immigrant in all three High Commission Territories,
nullifying his residence permit.45 The Matthews’ pre-determined plan to head
for Lesotho highlights how politically active South Africans knew about and
understood both the Lesotho residency requirements and British citizenship
law, and how they utilised both to further their political work.
ANC leader Dr Arthur Elias Letele was, unlike Matthews, a ‘belonger’ to
Lesotho so he did not need to apply for residency through the ERP, but he
too made use of the British citizenship on offer in the territory. Born in
Maseru in 1916, his parents moved shortly thereafter to Ladybrand in the
Orange Free State for work. Letele spent the rest of his childhood and early pro-
fessional life in South Africa. Qualifying as a medical doctor in 1946, he set up a
successful practice in Kimberley. Like Matthews he also joined the ANC Youth
League in 1944, and was elected treasurer of the Kimberley branch in 1948. He
was at the forefront of protests in Kimberley, being arrested multiple times in the
1950s. Letele gained national prominence by helping draft the Freedom Charter
in 1955 and was elected national treasurer-general of the ANC in 1955. This led
him to be one of the defendants, alongside Matthews and others, in the treason
trial that started in 1956.
Arrested at his Kimberley home on 30 March 1960, Letele spent almost four
months in jail after the declaration of the state of emergency. His birth in
Lesotho, however, meant that he was a British subject, and so his arrest and
detention attracted notice from British officials in South Africa. They had
little desire to take up Letele’s case because of his political work, and they did
so largely because of public pressure from the anti-colonial lobby in the UK.46
Letele’s ability to access a lawyer and to receive visits from his wife came
about primarily because of his status as a British subject. With no charges
filed against him over three months after his arrest, UK Labour MP Hilary Mar-
quand raised questions in parliament about the continued detention of a British
citizen on 30 June. This diplomatic pressure contributed to his release on 19 July,
but in exchange for leaving jail he had to agree to move back to Lesotho within
30 days.47
While Letele was displeased with deportation because it disrupted his success-
ful medical practice and his political work, he too had planned for this contin-
gency. He started paying South African income tax in 1948 with the opening of
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his medical practice in Kimberley, but he had also been paying general tax to the
Basutoland government since 1946 ‘apparently as reinsurance of British citizen-
ship’.48 This paid off in the representation and attention he received while
detained. Similarly, his arrival in Lesotho did not end his political work, as he
worked closely with Matthews to run a thriving ANC branch. The ANC bank
account in Maseru was under their names until Letele’s passing in 1965.49
With Matthews focused on external fundraising, Letele’s role was to facilitate
the flight of other refugees into Lesotho and support them once they arrived.
His most famous case was that of Anderson Ganyile, who fled to Lesotho, was
brazenly abducted by South African police from the territory in 1961 and,
after an international outcry, returned in 1962.50 But Letele did not just stay
in Lesotho. Using the CUKC passport he obtained after arrival, he made trips
on behalf of the ANC to Nigeria, Tanganyika, Egypt, Sweden, the UK and the
USSR. Between Letele and Matthews, the ANC had two key figures based in
Lesotho in the early 1960s, both of whommade extensive use of British passports
to press the ANC’s agenda abroad at a critical juncture when the organisation
was banned in South Africa.
PAC leaders also made use of the British passports on offer in Lesotho.
Mokhalake Elias Ntloedibe arrived in 1961 and gained residency through the
ERP. He received a British passport in October 1962, which allowed him to
travel to Ghana to take up the position there of chief representative for the
PAC.51 Similarly, Potlako Leballo, born in Lesotho, returned to the territory
after being released from his post-Sharpeville detention in 1962. He too
applied for and received a CUKC passport that he used to travel extensively
throughout Africa and beyond in the 1960s.52 The liberation groups thus
made extensive use of British passports obtained in Lesotho to allow their
leaders to further the aims of the groups internationally, but it was not only
external groups taking up passports in increased numbers.
Local people in Lesotho were also obtaining CUKC passports in much greater
numbers, but South Africa’s 1961 commonwealth departure was a greater cata-
lyst for their applications rather than the Sharpeville massacre. Again, archival
limitations in Lesotho make it impossible to determine the exact number of
Basotho who took this option, but the evidence available suggests that
demand spiked after May 1961. In the Leribe district from May to September
1961 there was a significant increase in demand for UK passport applications
from local residents. While a few Basotho had applied every year in the 1950s,
primarily for the purpose of studying abroad, on 30 May 1961 the district com-
missioner requested from Maseru 24 ‘C1 passport forms’ as ‘I am at present
completely out of stock… and there is a great demand for them’. By 9 June
1961, officials had ‘issued all the [passport applications] and had eight more
applicants on the waiting list’. Again on 21 June, the office requested two-
dozen more passport applications. This spike in demand continued with
further requests for forms on 10 July and 27 September.53 In all, at least 100
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Basotho applied for CUKC passports from this particular district office in just
over four months following the commonwealth departure. The largest number
of applicants in Lesotho would probably have come from the Maseru office,
an office for which we do not have numbers. Extrapolating from more than
100 Leribe applicants and nine districts total in Lesotho, it is safe to say that
the number of Basotho applying for the first time for a CUKC passport was
probably in the low thousands in the months and years immediately following
South Africa’s commonwealth departure. The speed with which Basotho
applied for passports suggests that a significant number of Basotho keenly
understood the potential benefits of claiming British citizenship and passports.
They were careful observers of how regional events impacted their lives, and
many understood that, for all the resistance Basotho had to the idea of coloni-
alism in general, obtaining a CUKC passport in the early 1960s would better
secure and protect the freedoms of movement, employment and travel opportu-
nities they valued.
From Migrant to Asylum Seeker: Citizenship and Decolonisation
The increase in the number of passport seekers by Lesotho ‘belongers’ and refu-
gees alike shows a growing awareness in the late colonial period of the impor-
tance that formal identity documents played in securing and protecting
individuals’ citizenship rights. Disputes over who had access to these papers,
and thus citizenship, later in the 1960s, however, highlight the fact that political
independence in many cases left messy questions about citizenship and resi-
dency unresolved for individuals. The experiences of political refugees like
Wycliffe Tsotsi and Joe Molefi also bring into focus the limits of sovereignty
that continued colonial obligations put on both Lesotho and the United
Kingdom in the decolonisation era.
Wycliffe Tsotsi was president from 1948 to 1958 of the All-African Conven-
tion (AAC), a group originally formed in 1935 to oppose South African attempts
to disenfranchise Africans in the Cape through the Representation of Natives
Act. The strength of the AAC lay in the Transkei region of the rural eastern
Cape that was located close to Lesotho’s southwest border. The South African
government, in part, blamed the organisation for the Pondoland Uprising of
1960.54 When the government declared a state of emergency in the Transkei
in December 1960, Tsotsi fled to Lesotho. He took up residence in Maseru
where he worked as an attorney, often in conjunction with Joe Matthews. He
applied for his residence permit in January 1961, and his case came before the
central control board at the same time as Matthews’ application in September
of that year. Unlike Matthews, however, Tsotsi was denied an indefinite resi-
dence permit as he had applied as a political refugee. The board members
rejected his application because the state of emergency in the Transkei had
ended, and they deemed him to be not a ‘genuine refugee’ because he was no
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longer ‘liable for arrest in the Republic’.55 This rationale, however, obscured the
real issue, which was that Tsotsi did not have the same good connections that
Matthews enjoyed with Basotho political leaders and the monarch. His law
work had included taking on the cases of PAC leaders who were gradually
wearing out their welcome in Lesotho among certain segments of the local pol-
itical class. Without Matthews’ personal connections, Tsotsi’s application fell
victim to fears expressed by Moshoeshoe II in September 1961 of ‘the continued
presence in Basutoland of the undesirable element [politically] from the
Union’.56 Moshoeshoe II and other Basotho political leaders worried that the
presence of high-profile political refugees like Tsotsi and the PAC leadership
in Maseru could sour relations between Lesotho and South Africa enough to
complicate or delay the push for Lesotho’s independence.
Tsotsi did not accept the denial of his residency application and continued to
appeal his case. With international support from UK anti-colonial MP Fenner
Brockway, among others, Tsotsi managed to get a series of short-term temporary
residency permits to stay in the territory. He also attempted to bypass the central
control board by persuading the chief of Thaba Bosiu to accept him in 1962 as a
‘belonger’, which should have entitled him to a permanent residency permit.57 It
is unclear exactly why, but this stratagem also failed. It is likely, though, that the
authorities—Basotho and British—saw this as a disingenuous attempt by Tsotsi,
as he was certainly not resident in the rural area around Thaba Bosiu under the
chief’s jurisdiction. Despite his failure to gain some sort of permanent residency,
he did obtain a CUKC passport on 11 February 1964, with citizenship applied
retroactively to 30 June 1962. While he lacked political connections at the
highest level locally, his connections abroad did help stay the hands of the colo-
nial authorities.
Like the ANC leaders in Maseru, Tsotsi continued his South African political
work while domiciled in Lesotho. He took multiple clandestine trips across the
border to meet with AAC leadership still in South Africa. In September 1964,
after one of these meetings in Durban, the South African police stopped his
vehicle and detained Tsotsi under the 90-day law. His recently established
British citizenship allowed him to received consular visits from British officials,
but South African authorities who wanted to keep him in detention denied that
he had given up or lost his South African citizenship.58 Basotho authorities on
the Executive Council in Lesotho were unhappy that Tsotsi had received
British citizenship and a CUKC passport. They had been the ones to deny his
residency requests, but, since it was the UK government that issued passports,
there was little they could do other than point out that he still did not have per-
manent or indefinite residency rights. The minutes of the control board meeting
dryly noted this fact, saying that his ‘residence was being dealt with under the
Basutoland E&RP’, suggesting that despite the passport and status as a British
subject, he was still not going to be able to claim local ‘belonger’ status.59 His
inability to formalise residency despite his ability to claim British citizenship
16 J. AERNI-FLESSNER
would dramatically and negatively impact Tsotsi after Lesotho’s 1966 indepen-
dence. His case, in particular, underscores that plenty of leaders and individuals
clearly understood the power of residency, citizenship and official papers even in
the colonial period.
After Tsotsi was released from a South African prison in December 1964, he
returned to Lesotho where he expanded his law practice, especially in the wake of
Matthews’ deportation in 1965. He was one of the only local lawyers willing and
able to take political cases. His own legal battle to receive permanent or indefi-
nite residency in Basutoland prior to independence in October 1966, however,
failed. By law, his British citizenship was supposed to turn into Lesotho citizen-
ship at the transfer of power, but this did not happen. In late 1966 the Lesotho
authorities deported him to South Africa, claiming he was not a legal resident of
the new state. This deportation came about largely because Tsotsi made himself
an enemy of the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) government by represent-
ing both King Moshoeshoe II and the opposition BCP in separate cases seeking
to limit the power of the BNP leaders at independence.60 While the deportation
came about officially because Tsotsi failed to secure a residency permit, it also
showed his personal malleability, as he had neutralised Moshoeshoe II’s
earlier opposition to his residency by acting as his advocate in court. Still,
Tsotsi became the most visible public face of refugees who were, in the BNP gov-
ernment’s view, working to subvert the independence and sovereignty of
Lesotho.
One of the first BNP legislative priorities after independence was passing the
Aliens Control Act of 1966 to replace the colonial ERP. Part of this law included
provisions to better control and surveil refugees by forcing them to apply for
permanent, indefinite or temporary residence permits prior to arrival in
Lesotho and making deportation an easier process.61 In the wake of an opposi-
tion protest that turned deadly when the Lesotho police opened fire on and killed
protestors, the Lesotho government deported Tsotsi through the Maseru Bridge
border crossing on 28 December 1966. Able to quickly escape the South African
border jail where he was initially placed, Tsotsi returned to Lesotho later that
same day and requested political asylum at the British High Commission
offices. The high commissioner refused his request on the grounds that they
now considered him to be a Lesotho citizen rather than a British subject, and
he, therefore, needed to talk to the same Lesotho authorities responsible for
his deportation. After a short stint in prison in Lesotho, and following nego-
tiations with the government, Tsotsi agreed to leave for Zambia on 13 January
1967. The Lesotho government decided they would rather pay transportation
costs for Tsotsi and his wife and negotiate with the South African government
to allow him passage than acknowledge the legitimacy of Tsotsi’s citizenship,
acquired through the vagaries of British late colonial policy.62
If Tsotsi’s story ended there, it would still be a remarkable example of linger-
ing colonial obligations imposing burdens on supposedly independent
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governments, but, by retaining and maintaining a claim to Lesotho citizenship,
Tsotsi ensured that the story continued. His ability to work or travel onward
from Zambia was extremely limited because he lacked a Lesotho passport, and
the Zambian government would not issue him papers either. The Zambians
worried that issuing papers would formalise his refugee status and turn him
into their obligation. Thus, Tsotsi spent the period from 1967 until 1978 stateless
and trapped in Zambia. Tsotsi’s citizenship limbo finally ended in 1978. With
the Lesotho government’s diplomatic priorities rapidly changing, he was able
not only to gain his long-coveted Lesotho citizenship, but also to return to
Maseru where he took a job as a top government lawyer. He had finally
‘made my peace with the Lesotho government and had even obtained Lesotho
passports’.63
The journey of Tsotsi that started with his arrival in Lesotho in late 1960 did
change at independence, but for him, it was not immediately a change for the
better. Despite his British citizenship, he had failed to gain local residency.
Since Basotho controlled the gate for that status, the Lesotho government
after independence felt within its rights to challenge Tsotsi’s eligibility for citi-
zenship and a passport. While his CUKC passport was no longer valid after inde-
pendence, his request for British asylum in late 1966 suggests that Tsotsi did not
view British obligations to him as complete despite the transfer of power. Tsotsi,
however, remained a thorn in the government’s side, as well as a reminder of the
colonial legacy that they could not shed. The Lesotho, British and even Zambian
governments wished to be done with Tsotsi and his complicated colonial-era
case, but with his status unresolved none could effectively police the boundaries
of national sovereignty or easily dispose of unwanted individuals.
The case of Joseph Sallie Poonyane Molefi also highlights the role that linger-
ing colonial obligations played in the calculations of both the Lesotho and UK
governments. Yet another treason trial defendant from late 1950s South
Africa, Molefi jumped bail in a separate case in 1961, fleeing to Lesotho.
Working as a journalist, Molefi was first active in the PAC in Maseru, though
he split with them in 1963 because he disagreed with the organisation’s turn
to violence. He petitioned the British government for asylum in 1962, asking
for ‘written security for [refugees’] continued stay without interference’ as a
way of formalising his status in the territory, but was turned down and told to
use the ERP process.64 Molefi’s petition was remarkably prescient, as the
Tsotsi case later proved, and it underscored how much the British government
resisted having long-term legal responsibility for refugees as the empire wound
down. The failure of this petition, and his inability or unwillingness—the record
is not clear—to attempt a permanent residence permit through the ERP meant
that Molefi, like Tsotsi, lived in Lesotho on a series of temporary residence
permits. The last of these permits expired on 31 December 1967. By this time,
of course, Lesotho was independent, and Molefi was working as a respected pro-
fessional journalist for South African newspapers, American wire services and
18 J. AERNI-FLESSNER
the BBC. He, like Tsotsi, fell out of favour with the BNP government. He had
filed a critical story about the BNP after the 1965 election, and so, when his tem-
porary residence permits finally ran out, he too faced deportation.65
Molefi fought his deportation order in the courts and used his international
political connections to mobilise support. He exhausted his appeals in Lesotho
and even took his case to the Privy Court in London. While his case was also
part of the BNP government’s wider crackdown on refugees in Lesotho, there
was a degree of protection for high-profile refugees like Molefi. That does not
mean, however, that Molefi and other refugees could ignore anti-refugee
public proclamations, like the one Prime Minister Jonathan made giving refu-
gees 30 days to leave Lesotho from 31 August 1968 or face criminal charges.
That particular order caused Molefi again to request political asylum in the
United Kingdom from the high commissioner in Maseru. The British again
turned down this asylum request, as they did with Tsotsi, arguing that Molefi
was supposed to have citizenship in Lesotho. While Prime Minister Jonathan
did not carry through on his threat to arrest and deport all refugees, such
threats had to be taken seriously.66 Molefi, unlike the others detailed here,
never availed himself of a CUKC passport in the colonial period, retaining his
South African citizenship, and he lost his final appeal before the Lesotho High
Court on 15 January 1969 when it ruled that he did not legally have the status
of refugee and could be deported.67
The Lesotho government acted, as they did with Tsotsi, as if the British
government should have responsibility for Molefi because his applications
for indefinite residency before a Basotho-majority board in the colonial
period had failed. The government saw this as evidence that he was not
entitled to ‘belonger’ status in Lesotho because representatives of the national
community had rejected his application. However, international pressure,
coming in large part from the former colonial government in London,
again hindered the ability of the Lesotho government to fully police the
boundaries of national citizenship. Thus, Molefi’s case remained in legal
limbo too. From the British perspective, the government did not want to
create a precedent for allowing a class of asylum seekers from southern
Africa. Rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the UK during the 1960s made
acceptance of asylum claims a severe political liability. Officials in London
worried that, if they accepted Molefi, southern African governments would
‘simply off-load’ their unwanted and troublesome South African refugees on
the United Kingdom by ‘threatening to expel them’ and, thus, getting the
UK to grant asylum.68 Therefore, the UK government pushed the Lesotho
government to accept Molefi as a Lesotho citizen so as to extinguish the possi-
bility of successful asylum claims on the UK.69
Despite its opposition to Molefi’s asylum requests and citizenship claims,
however, the UK government was not averse to having Molefi within its
borders. The UK offered to allow Molefi to enter on a work permit, as long
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as he had a job lined up and the Lesotho government would issue him a pass-
port. From the perspective of the British government, not only would a
Lesotho passport allow them to offload Molefi were he to get into trouble,
but it would also force the Lesotho government to validate his claim to citizen-
ship, and thereby end his potentially embarrassing asylum claims.70 The
Americans also expressed a willingness to accept him on a similar deal.71
Molefi never took up the offer of a work visa, in part because the Lesotho
coup of January 1970 disrupted normal diplomatic communications, but
largely because he wanted to stay in the southern African region. As with
Tsotsi, Molefi was able to reconcile with the Lesotho government later in
the 1970s as its priorities shifted. He formalised his status in Lesotho and
resided there until his death in 2003.
The cases of Tsotsi and Molefi illustrate not only how important the acqui-
sition of formal papers was to refugees, but also highlight that they were key
markers to governments attempting to draw the boundaries of citizenship and
sovereignty in the decolonisation period. Passports were, of course, not a fool-
proof method of claiming rights for individuals, but in all the cases when
people had such a document, it conferred important protections. The obligations
into which formal papers forced governments were also one reason why the
Lesotho and UK governments drew such stringent lines around who had
access to documents. In the case of citizenship claims originating in late colonial
Lesotho, governmental decisions made in the waning days and years of the colo-
nial period limited the ability of the independent Lesotho government to fully
police the boundaries of citizenship. At the same time, however, the cases also
limited the ability of the British government to fully sever its colonial obligations
to individuals who had received citizenship, even after the formal transfer of
power.
Conclusion
The cases of refugees are most salient in the archival record, especially those who
were able to marshal transnational interest in their cases. It was, however, not
simply high-profile refugees who understood the symbolic and real power of
official citizenship documents, as the number of Basotho taking up passports
in the wake of the South African commonwealth departure in 1961 showed.
The imposition of South African border controls with Lesotho in 1963 caused
a large increase in the number of Basotho seeking to regularise their status as
‘belongers’ in Basutoland/Lesotho. Prior to South Africa’s commonwealth
departure most Basotho had little need for a passport because they could
freely enter South Africa without one. Between 1961 and November 1965, the
colonial government issued 206,000 local passports to Basotho. The de jure
population of Lesotho at that time, for comparison, was around 800,000. A
local passport was a simplified identity document conferring ‘belonger’ status
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on the bearer that allowed Basotho to maintain visa-free entry into South Africa.
Many therefore took out the document because it entitled them to continue to
seek employment in South Africa’s rural areas.72 The number of Basotho forma-
lising their citizenship through documentation further continued after indepen-
dence, with, for example, the Lesotho government issuing 46,622 local passports
in 1971.73
Basotho used these papers to visit South African friends and relatives, shop
and find work throughout the remainder of the apartheid era, but they were
much more than simply entry papers. Many Basotho deliberately overstayed
their permitted time in South Africa to continue their work or pursue edu-
cational opportunities. South African authorities complained in 1971 that over
10,000 of 70,000 legal Basotho entrants had overstayed, with most overstayers
illegally residing in the urban areas to pursue employment opportunities.74
What was new after independence for Basotho was that their passports
allowed legal entry into South Africa. Thus, migrants often tried to slip back
across the border into Lesotho without having to show their crucial identity
document if they had overstayed. South African officials complained in 1972
that many Basotho had ‘disposed of their passports and other documents of
identity with the object to prevent or hamper prosecution and their repatria-
tion’.75 But Basotho were certainly not ‘disposing’ of their hard-won passports;
rather they were hiding them for future use. Basotho could get an official letter
from the Lesotho Labour Bureau in Johannesburg stating the document was lost,
and then they could attempt to return to Lesotho utilising that form letter at
border crossing, with the passport safely hidden in luggage. In 1972, dozens of
Basotho were arrested doing just that after passports were found in luggage in
a search at the Maseru Bridge border post.76
These deliberate obfuscation attempts by migrant Basotho suggest that under-
standings of citizenship rights, the importance of passports and border crossing
were at least as widespread among citizens of Lesotho as they were with political
refugees. With so many having first obtained passports in the colonial period, it
also suggests that rapid legal changes in late colonial Basutoland and South
Africa’s 1961 commonwealth exit ‘lived on’ in ways that hindered the ability
of the Lesotho, South Africa and United Kingdom governments to fully police
their sovereignty or access to identity papers. Those living on the margins in
the late colonial and early independence worlds of southern Africa did not
trust any government to fully protect their rights. When presented with the
opportunity, refugees and Lesotho ‘belongers’ alike eagerly took up the offer
of passports, whether issued by Britain or Lesotho. Thus, passports and the
claims that various individuals made on governments in the late colonial and
early independence periods are wonderful vehicles through which to examine
the limits of state sovereignty. The afterlives of empire seen here should serve
as a cautionary tale about how we must consider the transfer of power only as
one starting place from which to study the decolonisation process.
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